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ABSTRACT
In this paper I analyze the anatomy of current account adjustments in the world economy during the
last three decades. The main findings may be summarized as follows: (a) Major reversals in current
account deficits have tended to be associated to “sudden stops” of capital inflows. (b) The
probability of a country experiencing a reversal is captured by a small number of variables that
include the (lagged) current account to GDP ratio, the external debt to GDP ratio, the level of
international reserves, domestic credit creation, and debt services. (c) Current account reversals have
had a negative effect on real growth that goes beyond their direct effect on investments. (d) There
is persuasive evidence indicating that the negative effect of current account reversals on growth will
depend on the country’s degree of openness. More open countries will suffer less  n in terms of
lower growth  n than countries with a lower degree of openness. (e) I was unable to find evidence
supporting the hypothesis that countries with a higher degree of dollarization are more severely
affected by current account reversals than countries with a lower degree of dollarization. And, (f)
the empirical analysis suggests that countries with more flexible exchange rate regimes are able to
accommodate the shocks stemming from a reversal better than countries with more rigid exchange
rate regime.
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I.     Introduction 
 
Recent discussions on international macroeconomic policy have centered on the 
large current account imbalances experienced by a number of countries, including the 
United States with a deficit of 5% of GDP and China with a surplus of almost 3% of 
GDP.
1  Policy makers, analysts and academics have focused on the international 
adjustment process, and have discussed the way in which the correction of these current 
account imbalances is likely to affect exchange rates, job creation and economic growth.
2  
The source of financing of the U.S. current account deficit has also become a source of 
concern. A number of analysts have argued that by relying on foreign -- and particularly 
Asian -- central banks’ purchases of Treasury securities, the U.S. has become particularly 
vulnerable to sudden changes in expectations and economic sentiments.
3 The 
International Monetary Fund’s former Director of Research, Ken Rogoff, has made a 
similar point.  In a press conference given in September 18
th 2003, a few days before 
stepping down from the position, he said:
4   
 
“[L]ooking…to the second half of 2004 and beyond, there are still many risks… 
These include the disturbing pattern of global current account imbalances, which 
is likely to get worse before it gets better, with the United States continuing to 
absorb a large share of world savings, and Asia providing much of it.” (Rogoff, 
2003). 
 
And from here Rogoff went on to argue that the effects of these imbalances on 
currency values are likely to be significant: 
 
                                                           
1 Although it has attracted less international attention, Russia’s current account surplus, in excess of 8% of 
GDP, is also becoming the subject of some debate. 
2 During his much-publicized trip to China and Japan in September 2003, U.S. Treasury Secretary John W. 
Snow tried to persuade the Japanese and Chinese authorities that they should allow their currencies to 
appreciate relative to the U.S. dollar.  An appreciation of the Yen and the Renminbi, he implied, would 
allow for a gradual correction of international imbalances and for a fairer distribution of the burdens of 
adjustment.  Indeed, many analysts have argued that a strengthening of the Asian currencies is required to 
lift some of the pressure from the Euro, whose appreciation during the last year and a half has seriously 
affected European competitiveness. See, for example, Hughes (2003) 
3 See, for example, Martin Wolf’s October 1
st, 2003 article in the Financial Times, “Funding America’s 
recovery is a very dangerous game,”  (page 15).    2
“[W]hen the dollar falls, the question is, where is the burden of adjustment going 
to be? It is going to be a serious problem regardless of how the fall in the dollar is 
distributed although the more slowly it happens, the better. But, clearly, if the 
euro has to bear the lion's share of the adjustment in the dollar, that is going to 
create a lot more difficulties than if it is more evenly distributed; than if the Asian 
currencies--not just China but all the Asian currencies--also appreciate, allowing 
themselves to appreciate significantly against the dollar.” (Rogoff, 2003). 
 
Discussions on current account imbalances and on the burden of the adjustment 
process are not new in international policy circles.  Indeed, in the 1940’s Keynes was 
clearly aware of the issue, and his proposal for an international Clearing Union was 
based on the notion that in the face of large payments imbalances both deficit and surplus 
nations should share the burdens of adjustment.
5   
In recent years there have also been concerns regarding current account behavior 
in the emerging and transition countries.  In particular, a number of authors have asked 
whether large current account deficits have been associated with the currency crises of 
the 1990s and 2000s.  While some authors, including Fischer (2003), have argued that 
large current account deficits are a sign of clear (and future) danger, others have argued 
that significant deficits do not increase the probability of a currency crisis (Frankel and 
Rose, 1996).  Recently, much of the discussion on the emerging and transition nations 
has moved towards the implementation of appropriate “crisis prevention” policies.  
Within that spirit a number of analysts have developed models of current account 
sustainability, and have asked what determines the sustainable level of international 
financing that a particular country is able to secure over the medium and long run.
6  Some 
authors have also analyzed episodes of current account reversals, or large reductions in 
the current account deficit in a short period of time (Milesi-Ferreti and Razin 2000, 
Edwards 2002). 
                                                                                                                                                                             
4 The complete press conference can be found at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2003/tr030918.htm 
5 See, for example, the discussion in Chapter 6 of Skidelsky’s (2000) third volume of Keynes’ biography, 
and the papers, reports and memoranda by Keynes cited in that chapter.  
6 Some of the most influential work on this subject has been done at the IMF by Gian Milesi-Ferreti and his 
associates.  See Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (1997, 1998, 2000), Ostry (1997), Adedeji (2001), McGettigan 
(2000), Knight and Scacciavillani (1998).   3
Modern macroeconomic models of the open economy have emphasized the fact 
that the current account is an intertemporal phenomenon. These models recognize two 
basic interrelated facts.  First, from a basic national accounting perspective the current 
account is equal to savings minus investment.  Second, since both savings and investment 
decisions are based on intertemporal factors -- such as life cycle considerations and 
expected returns on investment projects --, the current account is necessarily an 
intertemporal phenomenon.  Sachs (1981) emphasized forcefully the intertemporal nature 
of the current account, arguing that to the extent higher current account deficits reflected 
new investment opportunities, there was no reason to be concerned about them. An 
important and powerful implication of intertemporal models is that, at the margin, 
changes in national savings should be fully reflected in changes in the current account 
balance (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996).  Empirically, however, this prediction of the theory 
has been systematically rejected by the data.
7  Typical analyses that have regressed the 
current account on savings have found a coefficient of approximately 0.25, significantly 
below the hypothesized value of one.   
Numerical simulations based on the intertemporal approach have also failed to 
account for current account behavior.  According to these models a country’s optimal 
response to negative exogenous shocks is to run very high current account deficits, indeed 
much higher than what is observed. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), for example, develop a 
model of a small open economy where under a set of plausible parameters the steady 
state trade surplus is equal to 45 percent of GDP, and the steady state debt to GDP ratio is 
equal to 15.
8  According to a model developed by Fernandez de Cordoba and Kehoe 
(2000) the optimal response to a financial reform in an industrial country such as Spain is 
to run a current account deficit that peaks at 60% of GDP.
9  
In trying to explain the lack of empirical success of intertemporal models a 
number of authors have compiled a list of (inadequate) assumptions that can account for 
the observed discrepancies between theory and reality.  These include non-separable 
                                                           
7 See, for example, Ogaki, Ostry and Reinhart (1995), Gosh and Ostry (1997), and Nason and Rogers 
(2003). 
8   Ostfeld and Rogoff (1996) do not claim that this model is particularly realistic.  In fact, they present its 
implications to highlight some of the shortcomings of simple intertemporal models of the current account. 
9   Their analysis is carried on in terms of the trade account balance.  In their model, however, there are no 
differences between the trade and current account balances.   4
preferences, less than perfect international capital mobility, fiscal shocks and changing 
interest rates (Nason and Rogers, 2003).  In a series of recent papers Kraay and Ventura 
(2000, 2002) and Ventura (2003) have proposed some amendments to the traditional 
intertemporal model that go a long way in helping bridge theory with reality.  In their 
model portfolio decisions play a key role in determining the evolution of the current 
account balance.  When investors care about both return and risk, changes in savings will 
not be translated into a one-to-one improvement in the current account.  In this case 
investors will want to maintain the composition of their portfolios, and only a proportion 
of the additional savings will be devoted to increasing the holdings of foreign assets (i.e. 
bank loans).  In addition, they argue that when short run adjustment costs in investment 
are added to the analysis, the amended intertemporal model traces reality quite closely.   
In this setting the behavior of countries’ net foreign assets play an important role in 
explaining current account behavior.  In particular, and as pointed out by Lane and 
Milesi-Ferreti (2002, 2003), changes in foreign asset valuation stemming from exchange 
rate adjustments will tend to affect the adjustment process and the evolution of current 
account balances.   
Models that emphasize portfolio balance are also promising for understanding 
current account behavior in emerging countries.  In particular, shifts in portfolio 
allocations driven by changes in perceived risk in the emerging countries can explain 
some of the large changes in current account deficits observed in these countries, 
including major current account reversals.  As pointed out by Edwards (1999), a 
reduction in foreigners’ (net) demand of an emerging country’s assets will result in a 
decline in the country’s sustainable current account deficit, forcing it into adjusting.  
Indeed, if this reduction in foreigners’ demand for the country’s assets is abrupt and 
significant – that is, if the country faces what has become to be known as a “sudden stop” 
--, we are very likely to observe a major current account reversal.  The magnitude of the 
current account adjustment will be particularly large during the transition from the “old” 
to the “new” foreign (net) demand for the country’s assets.  Although portfolio-based 
models of the current account are powerful and show considerable promise, there are still 
a number of questions that need to be addressed.  As Ventura (2003) has argued, these 
include understanding better the role of trade in contingent financial claims, and   5
understanding why international risk sharing is limited and why countries do not buy 
insurance.  
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the historical behavior of current account 
imbalances, and the patterns of adjustment followed by countries with large payments 
disequilibria.
10 Since the focus of the discussion is on adjustment, the analysis mostly 
deals with “extreme” observations or episodes when countries have experienced “large” 
deficits and, to some extent, large surpluses.  I am particularly interested in understanding 
the connection between current account adjustments and exchange rates.  I am also 
concerned with the costs of current account deficit reversals, and their connection to 
“sudden stops” of capital inflows.
11  I analyze whether openness, the extent of 
dollarization, and the exchange rate regime affect the costs of reversals.  Broadly 
speaking, in addressing these issues I am interested in tackling the question of whether 
the current account “matters.”   More specifically, I ask whether economic authorities 
should be concerned if the country in question runs (large) current account deficits.  In 
the past, authors that have dealt with this issue have reached different conclusions.  Sachs 
(1981), for example, argued that to the extent that a (large) deficit was the result of an 
increase in investment, there was no cause for concern or for policy action.   In an 
important article Corden (1994) argues that “[a]n increase in the current account deficit 
that results from a shift in private sector behavior – a rise in investment or a fall in 
savings – should not be a matter of concern at all (Corden 1994, p. 92, emphasis added).”  
This view that large current deficits don’t matter if they stem from private sector behavior 
has been associated with former Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson, and is 
sometimes referred to as Lawson’s Doctrine.  In a series of papers Fischer (1988, 1994, 
2003) has taken a different position.  For example, in Fischer (1988, p. 115) he argued 
that the “primary indicator [of a looming crisis] is the current account deficit.  And in 
1994, months before the Mexican crisis, he said: “[t]he Mexican current account deficit is 
huge, and it is being financed largely by portfolio investment.  Those investments can 
turn around very quickly and leave Mexico with no choice but to devalue…And as the 
                                                           
10 This paper is part of a research project on adjustment in the open economy.  Other papers in this project 
include Edwards (1999), De Gregorio, Edwards and Valdes (2000),  Edwards and Susmel (2003) and 
Edwards (2003). 
11  On “sudden stops” see Dornbusch et al (1996) and Calvo (2003).   6
European and especially the Swedish experiences show, there may be no interest rate 
high enough to prevent an outflow and a forced devaluation” (1994, p. 306).
12 
In terms of the current literature, this paper is (somewhat) in the tradition of the 
work by Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (1998, 2000) and Edwards (1999, 2002, 2003) on 
sustainability, and of the recent work by Ventura (2003), Kraay and Ventura (2000, 2003) 
and Edwards (2002) that emphasizes the role of portfolio asset allocation in 
understanding current account behavior.   The paper is eminently empirical; readers 
interested in models of the current account are referred to Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) 
and Ventura (2003).   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II I provide a broad 
analysis of current account behavior in the world economy during the last three decades.  
I analyze the distribution of imbalances across regions and countries, and I deal with 
imbalances’ persistence through time.  Section III is devoted to the adjustment process.  I 
use frequency tables and non-parametric tests to analyze the most salient aspects of 
current account adjustment during the last three decades.  In particular, I make a 
distinction between exchange rate-based adjustments and reserves-based adjustments, 
and I investigate the characteristics of episodes with persistent large deficits. I also 
analyze the connection between reversals and “sudden stops” of capital inflows.  Section 
IV deals with the costs of deficit reversals; in it I extend previous work by Milesi-Ferreti 
and Razin (2000) and Edwards (2002) in several directions: First, I use a treatment 
regressions approach to estimate jointly the probability of experiencing a reversal and the 
effect of reversals on economic growth.  Second, I explicitly investigate whether the costs 
of reversals – if any -- have been related to the economy’s degree of openness, its degree 
of dollarization and its exchange rate regime.  Finally, in Section V I provide some 
concluding remarks. In the Appendix I provide some tables that complement the analysis 
discussed in the text. 
II.  Three Decades of Current Account Imbalances 
In this section I analyze the distribution of current account balances in the world 
economy during the last thirty-two years.  The data are taken from the World Bank data 
                                                           
12 In Edwards (2002) I argue that there is evidence suggesting that large current account deficits increase 
the probability of a balance of payments crisis.  For results that point in the opposite direction see Frankel 
and Rose (1996).   7
set and cover all countries – advanced, transition and emerging – for which there is 
information.
13  In order to organize the discussion I have divided the data into six regions:  
(1) Industrialized countries; (2) Latin America and the Caribbean; (3) Asia; (4) Africa; 
(5) Middle East and Northern Africa; and (6) Eastern Europe.  The data set covers 157 
countries during the 1970-2001 period.  There are over 3,600 observations, and it is the 
largest data set that can be used in empirical work on the current account.  There are 643 
observations for the industrial countries, 808 for Latin America and the Caribbean, 513 
for Asia, 1,108 for Africa, 297 for the Middle East and North Africa, and 286 for Eastern 
and Central Europe.  As will be explained later, in some of the empirical exercises I have 
restricted the data set to countries with population above half a million, and income per 
capita above $ 500 in 1985 PPP terms.  For a list of the countries included in the analysis 
see the Appendix.   
II.1 The International Distribution of Current Account Imbalances 
The data on current account imbalances during the last three decades are 
summarized in Figures 1 and 2.  In these figures, as in all tables in this paper, a positive 
number denotes a current account deficit; surpluses have a negative sign. Figure 1 
contains “box-and-whisker” plots that summarize the distribution of current account 
deficits for each of the six regions.  The lines in the middle of each box represent the 
median of the current account balance for that particular region.  Each box extends from 
the 25
th percentile of the distribution to the 75
th percentile, thus covering the interquartile 
range (IQR).  The lines that come out from each box are called the whiskers, and extend 
to the largest data point up to 1.5 times the corresponding edge of the IQR.  The whiskers 
capture the so-called adjacent values. Observations beyond the end of the whiskers are 
depicted individually.  Finally, the width of each box reflects the number of observations 
in each region.
14 In Figure 2, on the other hand, I present the evolution of the average 
current account deficit to GDP ratio by regions for the 1970-2001 period. 
A number of interesting aspects of current account behavior emerge from these 
Figures, and from the supporting data (see the Appendix for details on the distributions 
                                                           
13  When data from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics are used the results are very similar, 
however. 
14 See Chambers et. al. (1983).  The Stata manual provides a simple and useful explanation of box-and-
whisker graphs.   8
by region and year). As Figure 1 shows, during this period the median balance was in 
every one of the six regions -- including in the industrial countries -- a deficit. For the 
complete thirty-two year period (1970-2001) more than one half of the countries had 
current account deficits in excess of 3.1% of GDP. For this thirty-two years period the 
third quartile corresponds to a current account deficit of 7.2% of GDP.  Naturally, and as 
Figure 1 shows, the third quartile differs for each region, with the largest values 
corresponding to Africa and Latin America, with current account deficits of 9.9% and 8% 
of GDP respectively. The industrial countries have the smallest third quartile, with a 
deficit of 3% of GDP.   Figure 1 also shows that the lowest limit of the interquartile range 
– the first quartile -- corresponds to a current account surplus in only three of the regions: 
Asia, Industrial Countries and the Middle East.  The overall value (for all countries and 
years) of the first quartile corresponds to a current account surplus of 0.28% of GDP. 
Out of the 3,655 country-year observations in the sample, 923 correspond to 
current account surpluses, and 2,732 correspond to deficits.  Moreover, for the period as a 
whole the number of deficit countries exceeds the number of surplus countries in every 
one of the regions.  Naturally, since by construction the sum of all current account 
balances around the world should add up to zero, the smaller number of surplus countries 
have to run relatively large individual surpluses, when these are measured in currency 
terms.
15  
Figure 2 shows that after the 1973 oil-shock there were important changes in 
average current account balances in the industrial nations, the Middle East and Africa.  
Interestingly, no discernible change can be detected in Latin America or Asia.  An 
analysis of median and third quartile balances, however, shows a different picture, and 
indicates that after 1973 there were significant shifts in the distribution of balances (see 
the Appendix for year-to-year details).  For example, the median balance climbs from a 
deficit of 1% to one of 4% in Latin America; in Asia it goes from less than 1% to 3% of 
GDP.  Interestingly, the median and third quartile deficits for Africa experience a decline 
after 1973, reflecting the region’s inability to finance these large shocks.  In contrast with 
the first oil shock, the 1979 oil shock affected both the means and medians of current 
                                                           
15 An interesting recent puzzle is that the growing discrepancy between the sum of all recorded deficits and 
surplus: as a practical matter, the sum of all current account balances is not equal to zero.  Dealing with this 
(important) issue is beyond the scope of the current paper, however.   9
account balances in every region in the world. The impact of this shock was particularly 
severe in Latin America, where the deficit jumped from an average of 3.7% of GDP in 
1978 to over 10% of GDP in 1981.   
Figure 2 captures vividly the magnitude of the external adjustment undertaken by 
the emerging economies during the debt crisis of the 1980s.  In Latin America, for 
example, the reduction in the average current account deficit amounted to 7.3% of GDP 
between 1981 and 1985.  As may be seen from Figure 2, during the 1980s adjustment 
was not confined to the Latin American region.  Indeed, other emerging regions also 
experienced severe reductions in their deficits during this period.  In Asia, for instance, 
the current account adjustment was almost 8% of GDP between 1981 and 1984.  As 
Figure 2 shows, the late 1990s and early 2000s have also been characterized by very large 
adjustments in the emerging and transition countries.  These adjustments have been the 
related to the recurrent currency crises of the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s, 
and have been particularly severe in Asia and Eastern Europe, where average balances 
adjusted by 7.5% and 6.3% of GDP, respectively.  These tables also show that the 
industrialized countries went back to having sustained surpluses only after 1993.
16 
II.2 High and Persistent Current Account Deficits and Surpluses 
According to modern intertemporal models of the current account, including the 
portfolio-based models of Kraay and Ventutra (2000, 2002) and Edwards (1999, 2002), 
countries will tend to experience short-term deviations from their long run sustainable 
current account levels.
17  This implies that large current account imbalances – or large 
                                                           
16 From the perspective of current controversies on the international adjustment process, it is interesting to 
compare the historical behavior of the United States current account to the distribution of current accounts 
for the industrial countries as a group. During the 1970s the U.S. run either small surpluses or small 
deficits, and the country’s current account was very close to the median of the distribution for the industrial 
nations.  During most of the eighties the U.S. run a current account deficit.  However, in every year but one 
(1987) the deficit was below the third quartile threshold for the industrial countries.  In 1987 an adjustment 
process began; the deficit declined steadily until in 1991 the U.S. ran a small current account surplus.  
Starting in 1992 a long period of deficits – which continues until today – began.  In 1999, 2000 and 2001 
the U.S. current account deficit was among the 25% largest deficits of all industrial countries.  There is 
little doubt that once data for 2002 and 2003 are collected, the U.S. will again be among the highest deficit 
countries’ for those two years.  This will make the U.S. the first large industrial country to have persistently 
large current account deficits for five or more consecutive years – see the discussion below on persistent 
deficits. 
17 In these models changes in current account balances are (largely) the result of efforts by domestic 
economic agents to smooth consumption. The sustainable level of the current account balance, in turn, will 
depend on portfolio decisions both by foreigners as well as by domestic investors. 
   10
deviations from sustainability -- should not be persistent through time.  Once the 
temporary shocks that trigger the large imbalances have passed, the current account will 
return to its long-run sustainable level. In this sub-section I use the data set described 
above to analyze the degree of persistence through time of large current account 
imbalances.  I am particularly interested in finding out whether the degree of persistence 
is similar for large deficits and for large surpluses. I do this by estimating a number of 
probit regressions on the probability of countries’ having a high deficit (or surplus) in a 
particular year.  Although this analysis is not a test of the basic intertemporal models, or 
their portfolio-based versions, it does provide information on the important issue of 
persistence of large current account imbalances.  As a first step I constructed two 
measures of “high deficits” and two measures of “high surpluses.”   
•  “High Deficit 1:” This index takes the value of one if, in a particular year, a 
country’s deficit is higher than its region’s third quartile.  The index takes a 
value of zero otherwise.
18 
•  “High Deficit 2:” This index takes the value of one if, in a particular year, a 
country’s deficit is higher than its region’s ninth percentile. It takes a value of 
zero otherwise.  Notice that this definition is “stricter” than the High Deficits 1 
definition. 
•  “High Surplus 1:” This index takes the value of one if, in a particular year, a 
country’s surplus is among its region’s 25% highest surpluses. The index 
takes a value of zero otherwise. 
•  “High Surplus 2:” This index takes the value of one if, in a particular year, a 
country’s surplus is among its region’s 10% highest surpluses.  It takes a value 
of zero otherwise. 
 
In order to investigate the degree of persistence of high current account 
imbalances I estimated a number of panel probit regressions of the following type:  
 
(1)  high j t = α  + Σ  β  k high j t-k + γ  X j t + ε  j t. 
                                                           
18 Notice that the thresholds for defining High deficits and surpluses are year-specific.  That is, for every 
year there is a different threshold for each region.   11
Where high j t is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if country j has a high surplus 
(deficit) in period t; X j t, refers to other covariates including time, country and/or region 
fixed effects. ε  j t is an error term with the usual properties.
19  My main interest is on the β  
k coefficients on lagged high surpluses (deficits): I am interested in finding out whether 
having had a high deficit in the past (up to four years) affects the probability of having a 
high deficit in the current period.  The results are in Table 1, where as is customary I 
report the estimated (dF/dx) coefficients, which capture the change in the probability of a 
high surplus (deficit) in period t, if there is a high deficit in period t-k.
20  As may be seen, 
the coefficients of all four years’ lagged high surpluses’ indicators are significantly 
different from zero at conventional levels, indicating a certain degree of persistence of 
high surpluses. Interestingly, when regressions of this type were estimated for the case of 
high deficits – equation 2 in Table 1 --, the results were quite different, and only the first 
two lagged coefficients are significantly different from zero.  These estimates suggest 
that during the last three decades the international adjustment process has tended to be 
asymmetric: high current account surpluses have tended to be more persistent than 
current account deficits.  This conclusion is supported by an analysis of the number of 
countries that have experienced high deficits or surpluses for at least five consecutive 
years. Table 2 contains such a list for the case of deficits; the case of surpluses is in Table 
3. 
As may be seen from Table 2 a rather small number of countries has experienced 
long periods of high deficits.  Consider the case of Latin America, a region with a 
reputation of macroeconomic mismanagement: according to the first definition, only 
three countries have had persistently high deficits, and of only one these -- Nicaragua – 
has had a high deficit for more than ten consecutive years.
i According to the data in 
Column A, only 7 out of the 49 African countries are persistent high deficit countries.  
Interestingly, New Zealand is the only country in the sample that according to the first 
definition has had two episodes of high persistent deficits – 1982-1988 and 1994-2001. 
Column A in Table 2 shows that only four countries in the sample – Australia, Nicaragua, 
                                                           
19 An alternative strategy would be to estimate regressions using the quintiles themselves as the dependent 
variable.  The results convey the same message as those reported here, however. 
20 The dF/dx have been computed for a discrete change in the dummy variables from 0 to 1, and have been 
evaluated for the mean values of all the regressors.    12
Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania – have had high deficits that have persisted for more than 
10 consecutive years.
21  
As Column A in Table 3 shows, there are 30 episodes of persistently high 
surpluses during the period under study.
22  Of these, 9 correspond to advanced nations. 
Four of the 30 persistently high surplus episodes took place in major oil producers – 
Trinidad-Tobago, Nigeria, Kuwait and Russia --, and five episodes correspond to 
countries belonging to the South African currency union (Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa 
and Swaziland).   Interestingly, neither China nor Japan have been among the persistent 
high surplus countries during the last few years– that is, after 1998.  Of the 30 high 
surplus episodes in Column A of Table 2, 9 have lasted for more than 10 years, and four 
countries have had more than one five year-episode with high surpluses.  Both of these 
figures are significantly higher than the equivalent ones for the case of high deficits; 
indeed, as Table 1.A shows, only four countries had high deficits for ten or more 
consecutive years, and only one had more than one five-year episode with high deficits 
(New Zealand).  
 
III.  The Anatomy of Current Account Adjustments  
In this Section I investigate the anatomy of the adjustment processes in high 
deficit countries.  I am interested in investigating as many of the main aspects of the 
adjustment process as possible.  In this section I report empirical results that deal with the  
following questions: 
•  Has adjustment tended to be gradual, or rather abrupt?  
•  How common have large deficit “reversals” been during the last three 
decades?   
•  Has the incidence of current account deficit reversals been similar across 
regions?  
                                                           
21 When different and a stricter definition of high and persistence deficits is used – those countries with 
deficits in the 10
th decile of the distribution for at least five consecutive years --, the results are broadly 
consistent with those discussed here – see Column B of Table 2 for details. 
22 Notice that I am referring to “episodes.”  Some countries have had more than one episode of high and 
persistent surpluses.   13
•  Following deficit reversals, have the current account adjustments tended to be 
lasting, or have current account balances deteriorate shortly after the reversal 
episode? 
•  Historically, have major current account deficits reversals been associated 
with “sudden stops” of capital inflows? 
•  To what extent have deficits’ reversals been associated with balance of 
payments and/or currency crises?  
•  Have current account deficit reversals been associated with banking crises?   
•  Have current account reversals tended to take place within the context of IMF 
programs?  
•  Have current account deficit reversals have a negative effect on growth or 
other forms of real economic activity?  The analysis of this particular question 
is the subject to Section IV of this paper. 
 
The analysis presented in this section differs from other work on the subject, and in 
particular from studies on current reversals such as Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (2000), 
Edwards (2002) and Guidotti et. al. (2003), in several respects.  First the coverage, both 
in terms of countries and time period, is greater in this paper than in previous work.  
Second, I use a methodology based on the calculation of non-parametric tests and 
frequency tables.  And, third, I analyze aspects of reversals – including their possible 
connection to banking crises and “sudden” stops of capital inflows – that have not been 
addressed in previous work.  
III.1 Current Account Deficit Reversals: Incidence and Duration 
  I define current account deficit reversals – reversals, in short -- in two alternative 
ways. (1)  Reversal A is defined as a reduction in the current account deficit of at least 
4% of GDP in one year.  (2) Reversal B is defined as a reduction in the current account 
deficit of at least 6% of GDP in a three-year period.
23  
                                                           
23 In both cases the timing of the reversal is recorded as the year when the episode
 ends.  That is if a country 
reduces its current account deficit by 7% of GDP between 1980 and 1982, the episode is recorded has 
having taken place in 1982.  Also, for a particular episode to classify as a current account deficit reversal, 
the initial balance has to be indeed a deficit.  Notice that these definitions are somewhat different from   14
In Table 4 I present tabulation tables on current account reversals by region as 
well as for the complete sample.  These tables include two versions of the Pearson tests 
for the independence of the frequency of reversals across the six regions.
24  Panel A 
includes the results for the Reversal A definition, while Panel B has the results for the 
Reversal B definition.  As may be seen, for the complete sample the incidence of 
Reversals A was 11.8% of all country-year observations, while it was only 9.2% for the 
Reversals B definition. The lowest incidence of deficit reversals occurs in the advanced 
countries, with 2% and 2.7% incidence for Reversals A and B respectively; the region 
with highest incidences is Africa with 16.6% and 11.7% respectively.  As the χ
2 and the 
F statistics indicate, the incidence of deficit reversals is statistically different among the 
six different regions.  Homogeneity tests also indicate that once the industrial countries’ 
group is excluded, the incidence of reversals is still significantly different among the 
emerging and transition economies.  This finding differs from what was found by Milesi-
Ferreti and Razin (2000, p. 292), who found that the occurrence of reversals was similar 
across groups of countries. 
  From a policy point of view an important question is whether these reversals have 
been sustained through time, or whether they have been short lived.  I address this issue 
by investigating whether at horizons of 3 and 5 years after each reversal the current 
account deficit was still lower than what it was the year before the reversal.  The results 
obtained are reported for in Table 5.  As may be seen, these results suggest that in a vast 
majority of cases – between 68% to 83% of cases, depending on the definition of reversal 
--, the current account deficit was lower three or five years after the reversal than what it 
was the year before the reversal started. 
III.2 Current Account Deficits Reversals and “Sudden Stops” 
  Since the currency crises of the 1990s international economists have had a 
renewed interest on the behavior of capital flows around the world.  In particular, a 
number of authors have argued that in a world of high capital mobility “sudden stops” of 
capital inflows can be highly disruptive, forcing countries to implement costly 
                                                                                                                                                                             
those used in other studies, including Freund (2000), Milessi-Ferreti and Razin (2000), Edwards (2002) and 
Guidotti et al (2003). 
24 The first one is the traditional Pearson χ
2 test. The second one is an F-test, that makes a correction in case 
the data in the sample are not identically and independently distributed.   15
adjustments (Dornbusch et al 1995, Calvo 2003, Calvo et al 2003, Mody and Taylor 
2002).  In this subsection I investigate the connection between “sudden stops” and current 
account reversals. The results indicate that, as expected, these two phenomena have been 
closely related.  However, the relationship is less than one-to-one; historically there have 
been many major current account deficit reversals that have not been related to “sudden 
stops,” and there have been numerous “sudden stops” that have not been associated to 
reversals.  This indicates that when facing a “sudden stop” of capital inflows many 
countries have been able to effectively use their international reserves in order avoid an 
abrupt and major current account reversal.  At the same time, these results suggest that a 
number of countries have gone through large current account reversals without having 
faced a sudden stop in capital inflows.  Most of the countries in this group were not 
receiving large inflows to begin with, and had financed their large deficits by drawing 
down international reserves. 
  I defined a “sudden stop” episode as an abrupt and major reduction in capital 
inflows to a country that up to that time had been receiving large volumes of foreign 
capital.  More specifically, I imposed the following requirements for an episode to 
qualify as a “sudden stop”:  (1) The country in question must have received an inflow of 
capital larger to its region’s third quartile during the previous two years prior to the 
“sudden stop.”  And (2), net capital inflows must have declined by at least 5% of GDP in 
one year.
25 In Table 6 I present a tabulation of the incidence of sudden stops for the 
complete sample as well as by region.  As may be seen, the historical occurrence is less 
than 6% for the complete sample, and ranges from 3.5% for the advanced nations to 
10.6% for the Middle Eastern and North African countries.  When alternative and stricter 
definitions of sudden stops were used, the incidence for the complete sample declined to 
3.9% of all observations.  Notice that the non-parametric χ
2 and the F statistics indicate 
that the incidence of sudden stops is statistically different among the six different regions 
in our analysis. 
                                                           
25 In order to check for the robustness of the results, I also used two alternative definitions of sudden stops, 
which considered a reduction in inflows of 3 and 7 of GDP in one year.  Due to space considerations, 
however, I don’t report detailed results using these definitions. 
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In Table 7 I present two-way frequency tables for the “sudden stops” and the 
current account deficit reversal definition Reversal A, both for the complete sample as 
well as for each one of our six regions.  The Table shows that for the complete sample 
(2,228 observations) 46.1% of countries subject to a sudden stop also faced a current 
account reversal.  At the same time, 22.9% of those with reversals also experienced (in 
the same year) a sudden stop of capital inflows.  The regional data show that joint 
incidence of reversals and “sudden stops” has been highest in Africa, where 
approximately 62% of sudden stops happened at the same time as current account 
reversals, and almost 30% of reversals coincided with sudden stops.  Notice that for every 
one of the regions, as well as for the complete sample, the Pearson χ
2 tests have very 
small p-values, indicating that the observed differences across rows and columns are 
significant.  That is, these tests suggest that although there are observed differences 
across these phenomena, the two are statistically related.  Interestingly, these results do 
not change in any significant way if different definitions of reversals and sudden stops are 
used, or if alternative configurations of lags and leads are considered.  
III.3 Current Account Deficit Reversals, Adjustment and Currency Crises 
  In this subsection I investigate the nature of the adjustment associated with a 
current account deficit reversal.  I am particularly interested in finding out whether 
current account reversals have been associated with broadly defined currency crises. 
Authors that have previously looked into this issue have focused on rather narrow 
definitions of “crisis.”  For example, Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (2000) considered abrupt 
devaluations to construct several indexes of crisis.  Edwards (2002), on the other hand, 
focused on changes in an external condition index, as well as on discrete and large 
devaluations.  In this paper, and in contrast with previous work on the subject, I 
distinguish between two type of crises: “international reserves” crises, and “exchange 
rate” crises.  The starting point for this analysis is the construction of an index of 
“external pressures” along the lines suggested by Eichengreen et al (1996):   
 
(2)   ) / ( * ) / ( / R R e e I R e t ∆ − ∆ = σ σ .   
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Where ( e e/ ∆ ) is the rate of change of the nominal exchange rate, and ( R R/ ∆ ) is the rate 
of change of international reserves.  σ  e is the standard deviation of changes in exchange 
rates, and σ  R is the standard deviation of changes in international reserves.  Traditional 
analyses define a crisis ( t C ) to have taken place when the index in equation (2) exceeds 
the mean of the index plus k standard deviations.  The crisis indicator  t C  takes a value of 
one (crisis) or zero (no crisis) according to the following rule:
26 
 
(3)    
otherwise














Instead of focusing on this single traditional index, in this paper I construct two 
alternative crisis indicators, that help understand more fully the nature of the adjustment 
process.  These alternative indicators make a distinction between changes in C t that stem 
from large reductions in reserves, and changes in C t that are the result of massive 
devaluations.  In the construction of both of these indexes I take the value of k to be equal 
to two.  These crisis indicators are specifically defined as follows:
27 
•  International Reserves Crisis (Crisis_Res): In this case the decline in reserves 
by itself accounts for triggering the crisis indicator C t. That is, in this case, 
while the country experiences a major loss in international reserves, its 
nominal exchange rate does not go through a major adjustment.  
•  Exchange Rate Crisis (Crisis_Er): In this case it is the nominal exchange rate 
by itself that triggers the C t crisis indicator.  Here the country lets the 
exchange rate depreciate significantly, before it has experienced a major loss 
in international reserves.  
 
Table 8 presents a summary of the occurrence of the two types of crises for the complete 
sample, as well as for each one of the regions.  The table also includes the Pearson tests 
                                                           
26 The pioneer work here is Eichnegreen et al (1996), who suggested that the index (2) also included 
changes in domestic interest rates.  Most emerging and transition economies, however, don’t have long 
time series on interest rates.  For this reason, most empirical analyses are based on a restricted version of 
the index, such as 2. 
27 For details see the discussion in Edwards and Magendzo (2003).   18
for independence.  Three conclusions emerge from this table:  (a) crises have been a 
rather infrequent event.
28  (b) The occurrence of both type of crises is statistically 
different across regions (see the χ
2 statistic).  And (c) the incidence of Crisis_ER has 
been, in every region, greater than the incidence of Crisis_Res.
29  
I use non-parametric tests based on a stratified case-control methodology to 
analyze whether current account reversals have been associated to the two types of crises 
defined above.
30  This approach consists of formally testing – using a χ
2 statistic -- 
whether there is a significant relationship between a particular outcome (the case) and 
another variable to which both case and control variables have been “exposed.”  The first 
step is to separate observations into a “case group” and a “control group.”  Countries that 
for a given year have experienced a “crisis” are considered to be a “case.” Non-crisis 
observations constitute the “control group.”  The second step consists of calculating how 
many observations in both the case and control groups have been subject to a current 
account reversal – these are the “exposed” countries.  From this information an odds ratio 
is calculated, and a χ
2 test is computed in order to determine whether the odds ratio is 
significantly different from 1.  If the hypothesis that the odds-ratio is equal to one is 
rejected, then there is evidence supporting the hypothesis that countries that are subject to 
a reversal have a significant probability of experiencing a crisis.  
The results are presented in Table 9 for the Reversal A definition of current 
account reversals (4% of GDP in one year) – when the Reversal B definition (6% of GDP 
in three years) was used the results were very similar and, thus, are not reported here due 
to space considerations.  These results may be summarized as follows: (1) the hypothesis 
that the odds-ratios are the same across regions cannot be rejected for any of the two 
definitions of crisis (see the test for homogeneity).  This means that computing a single χ
2 
statistic is appropriate for the sample as a whole.  (2) The hypothesis that the odds-ratio is 
equal to one is rejected at conventional levels for the exchange rate definition of crises, 
                                                           
28 This is, in a way, by construction, since k was chosen to be equal to 2. 
29 As it has been usually been done in empirical work on crises I also built alternative indicators that 
considered a three-year window after each crisis.  The results, however, are very similar to those obtained 
when the basic definitions are used.  For this reason, and due to space considerations, I don’t report them in 
this paper. 
30 This approach is used frequently by epidemiologists.  I became interested in statistical techniques used 
by epidemiologists in doing research on financial crisis contagion across countries --see Edwards (2000).  
See Fleiss (1981) for details on the actual case-control method.   19
Crisis_Er.  This means that, statistically speaking, countries subject to current account 
reversals have a significant probability of suffering a major devaluation of their currency, 
even if international reserves do not decline massively.  And (3) the hypothesis that the 
odds ratio is equal to one cannot be rejected for the reserves definition of crisis 
Crisis_Res.  This means that the occurrence of current account reversals does not appear 
to increase the probability of a country facing a reserve-crisis, as defined above. 
III.4 Current Account Reversals, Banking Crises and IMF Programs 
  In this sub-section I investigate two final aspects of current account adjustment 
processes:  (a) whether current account reversals have historically been related to banking 
crises.  And (b), the relationship between current account reversals and IMF programs.  A 
number of authors have argued that one of the costliest effects of external shocks is that 
they tend to generate banking crises and collapses.   Most of the analyses on this subject 
have focused on the joint occurrence of devaluation crises and banking crises – see, for 
example, the discussion in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).  In this sub-section I take a 
slightly different approach, and I investigate whether major reversals in current account 
deficits – not all of which end up in devaluation crises, as established above -- have been 
associated with banking crises.  I address this issue in Table 10, where I present two-way 
tabulations for the Reversals A definition of current account reversals and a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if that year there has been a banking crises.
31  The 
three panels in Table 10 present two-way tabulations under different structures of lags: 
while in Panel A both variables are contemporaneous, in Panel B the dummy for banking 
crises is lagged one year.  This allows us to consider situations were a banking crisis 
follows in time a current account reversal episode.  Finally, in Panel C the Reversal A 
dummy has been lagged one year.  All three Panels – see, in particular the Pearson χ
2 
tests for independence of rows and columns -- show that there has not been a significant 
relation, at any lag or lead, between reversals and major banking crises. 
  In Table 11 I present two-way tabulation tables for the Reversals A indicator and 
dummy variable (imfprog) that takes the value of one if during that year the country in 
                                                           
31 The data on banking crises are from Glick and Hutchison (1999).  When the Reversals B definition is 
used the results are similar to those reported above.   20
question had an IMF program, and a value of zero otherwise.
32  As before, the tabulations 
are presented for three different lag-lead structures.  The results indicate that, at least 
within the leads and lags considered here, there has not been a strong historical relation 
between reversals and IMF programs.  Indeed, the χ
2 tests for independence of rows and 
columns have relatively high p-values. 
 
IV.    The Costs of Current Account Reversals  
In this section I investigate the extent to which current account reversals have had 
an effect on real economic performance.  I am particularly interested in analyzing if the 
impact of current account reversals on real economic activity depend on variables such as 
the country’s degree of openness, its degree of dollarization, and its exchange rate 
regime. According to a variety of models stemming form many different traditions – 
including models in the Mundell-Fleming tradition, as well as recent ones based on the 
“sudden stops” framework --, the real costs of foreign shocks are inversely proportional 
to the degree of openness of the economy.
33  According to these models, countries that 
are less open internationally will have to make a greater effort, in terms of reducing 
aggregate demand (absorption) and/or in terms of real devaluations, than counties with a 
larger external sector.  In models in the Mundell-Fleming tradition, this phenomenon is 
reflected in the fact that the expenditure reducing effort, for any given level of 
expenditure switching, is inversely proportional to the marginal propensity to import – 
see Frenkel and Razin, 1987.   
In a recent analysis of the 2001-02 Argentine crisis, Calvo et al (2003) have 
developed a model where a “sudden stop” of capital inflows results in an abrupt current 
account reversal, and in a major real exchange rate depreciation.  In this model the 
“required” real depreciation depends on the country’s degree of openness. Calvo et al 
(2003) argue that in Chile – one of the most open countries in Latin America – a “sudden 
stop” would require a 32% real depreciation to re-establish external equilibrium.
34  The 
                                                           
32  The variable imfprog takes a vlaue of one if in that year the country any of the following type of 
programs: Stand-by, ESAF, EFF and SAF.  The raw data for constructing this dummy were taken from 
Evrensel (2002) and from the IMF web page: http://www.imf.org/external/np/tre/tad/exfin1.cfm 
33 See, for example, Part II of Frenkel and Razin (1987) and Calvo et. al. (2003). 
34 The authors’ define “new equilibrium” as a situation where the current account deficit is completely 
eliminated.   21
authors’ calculations suggest that in relatively close Argentina the depreciation required 
for eliminating the current account deficit is, at 46%, significantly higher than in Chile.  
In this model the real depreciation that stems from the “sudden stop” -- and concomitant 
current account reversal – has a more negative effect on real performance in countries 
with a higher degree of dollarization.  This effect takes place through two channels.  First, 
countries with corporate dollarized liabilities will experience massive jumps in 
indebtedness and will be unable to service their debts.  Moreover, as Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy (2000) have argued, the value of collateral provided by producers of 
nontradables will decline significant, further amplifying the costs of the crisis.  The 
second channel is related to fiscal policy and fiscal sustainability. To the extent that a 
proportion of the public sector debt is denominated in foreign currency, the real 
depreciation will increase the ratio of public sector debt to GDP.
35  In order to maintain 
fiscal sustainability the authorities will have to run a higher primary surplus, thus, 
reducing aggregate demand and economic activity.   
For a long time economists have argued that the exchange rate regime plays an 
important role in the adjustment process. Meade (1951, p. 201-02) argued early on that 
countries with a flexible exchange rate regime are able to accommodate better external 
shocks, including terms of trade and capital account shocks.
36  This suggests that current 
account reversals will have a smaller (negative) effect on real economic activity countries 
with more flexible regimes.  In this section I use a treatment regressions framework to 
investigate empirically if these three factors – openness, the extent of dollarization, and 
the exchange rate regime – have indeed affected the way in which current account 
reversals affect real economic activity. 
Previous empirical work on the (potential) real effects of reversals have reached 
different conclusions.  Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (2000), for example, used both before–
and-after analyses as well as cross-country regressions to deal with this issue and 
concluded that “reversal events seem to entail substantial changes in macroeconomic 
performance between the period before and the period after the crisis but are not 
systematically associated with a growth slowdown (p. 303, emphasis added).”  Edwards 
                                                           
35 See Edwards (2003) for an analysis of the relationship between fiscal sustainability and the real exchange 
rate in very poor HIPC countries. 
36 For a discussion and empirical analysis of this proposition see Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2003).   22
(2002), on the other hand, used dynamic panel regression analysis and concluded that 
major current account reversals had a negative effect on investment, and that they had “a 
negative effect on GDP per capita growth, even after controlling for investment (p. 52).”  
Neither of these papers, however, analyzed the interaction between openness, 
dollarization or the exchange rate regime and the costs of current account reversals.
37 
IV.1  Current Account Reversals and Growth:  An Empirical Model 
Changes in investment constitute, almost by definition, the main channel through 
which current account reversals affect economic activity.  Since the current account 
deficit is equal to investment minus savings, a major reversal will imply, with a high 
degree of probability, a decline in investment and, thus, in economic activity.  An 
important question is whether reversals affect growth through channels other than 
investment.  In this section I tackle this issue by using panel data to estimate jointly 
growth equations and current account reversal equations.  
My main interest is to understand what is the conditional effect – if any --of a 
current account reversal on real macroeconomic performance. In order to do this, I use a 
“treatment effects” model to estimate jointly an “outcome equation” on real GDP growth 
and a probit equation on the probability that a country experiences a current account 
reversal. The empirical treatment effects model may be written as follows:    
 
(4)        y  t j =  x t j β  + γ  δ t j + θ  (δ t j ✕ Openness t j) + µ j t 
 
                                   1,    if    δ * j t   > 0 
(5)       δ j t   =        
                       0,     otherwise 
 
(6)     δ * j t =    w j t α   + ε  j t . 
 
                                                           
37 In a recent paper, Guidotti et al (2003) consider the role of openness in an analysis of imports and exports 
behavior in the aftermath of a reversal.  The spirit of their analysis, however, is somewhat different from 
that of the other works discussed here.   23
Equation (4) is the real growth equation, where y j t stands for real GDP growth in 
country j and period t; x j t is a vector of covariates that capture the role of traditional 
determinants of growth, such as investment, openness and government consumption; δ j t 
is a dummy variable (i.e. the treatment variable) that takes a value of one if country j in 
period t experienced a current account reversal, and zero if the country did not experience 
reversal. Accordingly, γ  is the parameter of interest: the effect of the treatment on the 
outcome. Whether the country experiences a current account reversal is assumed to be the 
result of an unobserved latent variable δ* j t, described in equation (5).  Openness is a 
variable that measures the extent to which country j in period t is open to international 
trade.  θ  is the coefficient of the interaction between openness and the reversal dummy.  
δ* j t, in turn, is assumed to depend linearly on vector w j t.  Some of the variables in w j t 
may be included in x j t  (Maddala 1983, p. 120).
38 β  and α  are parameter vectors to be 
estimated. µ j t  and ε  j t are error terms assumed to be bivariate normal, with a zero mean 
and a covariance matrix given by: 
 
         σ   ς 
(7)          ς 1   
 
If equations (4) and (6) are independent, the covariance term ς in equation (7) will be 
zero.  Under most plausible conditions, however, it is likely that this covariance term will 
be different from zero. 
  Greene (2000) has shown that if equation (4) is estimated by least squares, the 
treatment effect will be overestimated.  Traditionally, this problem has been tackled by 
estimating the model using a two-step procedure (Maddala 1983).  In the first step, the 
treatment equation (5) is estimated using probit regressions.  From this estimation a 
hazard is obtained for each j t observation.  In the second step, the outcome equation (4) 
is estimated with the hazard added as an additional covariate.  From the residuals of this 
augmented outcome regression, it is possible to compute consistent estimates of the 
variance-covariance matrix (7).  An alternative to the two step approach is to use a 
                                                           
38   It is assumed, however, that δ * j t does not depend on y j t.  Otherwise, as discussed below, the model 
cannot be identified.   24
maximum likelihood procedure to estimate the model in equations (4) through (7) 
jointly.
39  As shown by Greene (2000), the log likelihood for observation k is given by 
equations (5) and (5’): 
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The model in equations (4) – (7) will satisfy the consistency and identifying 
conditions of mixed models with latent variables if the outcome variable y j t is not a 
determinant (directly or indirectly) of the treatment equation -- that is, if y is not one of 
the variables in w in equation (6).
40 For the cases of per capita GDP growth this is a 
reasonable assumption.  
Since I am interested in understanding if openness (among other variables) plays a 
role in the effect of reversals on growth, one of the x j t variables in equation (4) is a term 
that interacts the dummy variable δ  t k and an openness variable.  The latter is defined as 
the ratio of imports plus exports over the country’s GDP.  Since the presence of such an 
interactive term makes the estimation of the system (4) - (8) somewhat complex, the 
results reported here correspond to the two-steps procedure described above. In the 
estimation I also impose some exclusionary restrictions; that is, a number of the wj t 
covariates included in equation (6), are not included in the outcome equation (4). These 
                                                           
39   The two-steps estimates yield similar results, and are available from the authors on request. 
40 Details on identification and consistency of models with mixed structures can be found in Maddala 
(1983).  See, also, Heckman (1978), Angrist (2000) and Wooldridge (2002).   25
exclusionary restrictions are not required for identification of the parameters, but they are 
generally recommended as a way of addressing issues of collinearity.
41 
IV.2  Basic Results:  Reversals and Openness  
In this section I report the results obtained from the estimation of the treatment 
effects model given by equations (4) through (7).  I proceed as follows: I first discuss the 
specification used for the first-stage probit equation on the probability of experiencing a 
current account reversal.  I then discuss the specification for the outcome equations on 
GDP growth.  Finally, I present the results from the estimation of the treatment models.  
In the subsections that follow I discuss some extensions and robustness issues.  
IV.2.1 Equation Specification 
a. The Treatment Equation: Following work done by Frankel and Rose (1996), 
Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (2000) and Edwards (2002) among others, in the estimation of 
the first step probit regressions I included the following covariates: (a) the ratio of the 
current account deficit to GDP lagged one, two and three periods.  It is expected that, 
with other things given, countries with a larger current account deficit will have a higher 
probability of experiencing a reversal.  The best results were obtained when the one-year 
deficit was included.  (b) The one-year lagged external debt over GDP ratio.  Its 
coefficient is expected to be positive in the estimation of the first step probit equation (6).  
(c) The ratio of net international reserves to GDP, lagged one year.  Its coefficient is 
expected to be negative, indicating that with other things given countries’ with a higher 
stock of reserves have a lower probability of experiencing a current account reversal.  (d) 
Short term (less than one-year maturity) external debt as a proportion of external debt, 
lagged one period.  Its coefficient is expected to be positive.  (e) The one-year lagged rate 
of growth of domestic credit.  Its coefficient is expected to be positive.  (f) The lagged 
ratio of external debt service to exports.  Again, its coefficient is expected to be positive.  
(g) Year dummies, and (h) country-specific dummies.  In some of the probit regressions I 
also included the ratio of FDI to GDP, and the public sector deficit (both lagged).  Their 
coefficients were not significant, however.  Since these variables were available for a 
relatively smaller number of observations than the other variables, they were not included 
in the final specification of the probit equations (6).   
                                                           
41  Wooldridge (2002).   26
b. The Growth Outcome Equations: The dependent variable was real GDP growth 
obtained from the World Development Indicators.  In specifying the growth equation I 
followed the by now standard empirical growth literature Barro and Sala-I-Martin 1995, 
Barro, 1996).  As is customary I included the following covariates:  (a) the logarithm of 
initial GDP: its coefficient is expected to be negative and capture (conditional) 
convergence.  (b) The investment to GDP ratio; its coefficient is expected to be positive.  
(c) The rate of growth of population, as a proxy for the rate of growth of labor.  (d) An 
openness index defined as the ratio of exports plus imports over GDP.  As Sachs and 
Warner (1995) have argued its coefficient is expected to be positive.  (e) The ratio of 
government consumption to GDP, whose coefficient is expected to be negative (Barro 
and Sala-I-Martin 1995). (f) Year dummies, and (g) country specific dummies.
42 
In addition to the covariates discussed above the outcome growth equation also 
includes the two variables of interest: The current account reversal dummy, and the 
current account reversal dummy interacted with the openness variable.  If current account 
reversals have a negative impact on economic activity, beyond their effects on 
investment, we would expect the coefficient of the reversals’ dummy to be significantly 
negative in the estimation of equation (4).  Moreover, if this effect is inversely 
proportional to the country’s degree of openness, the coefficient of the interaction 
between reversals and openness should be significantly positive. 
IV.2.2  Main Results 
In Table 12 I summarize the basic results obtained from the estimation of number 
of treatment models for GDP growth (the coefficients of the time-specific and country 
specific dummy variables are not reported due to space considerations). The table 
contains two panels.  The upper panel includes the results from the growth outcome 
equation; the lower panel contains the estimates for the “treatment equation,” or probit 
equation on the probability of experiencing a current account reversal.  As pointed out 
above, the treatment observations correspond to current account reversal episodes, and 
the untreated group is comprised of all country-year observations were there have been 
no reversals. Table 12 also includes the estimated coefficient of the hazard variable in the 
                                                           
42  These country specific dummies capture the effect of structural variables that do not change 
(significantly) through time.   27
second step estimation, as well as the estimated elements of the variance-covariance 
matrix (7).  The first two equations in the table include current values of the reversal 
dummy and of the interactive variable.  The last two equations also include lagged values 
for these variables.  Due to space considerations I only report the results for the Reversal 
A definition of current account reversals; those for the alternative Reversal B definition 
are similar. 
Probability of Experiencing a Current Account Reversal: The probit estimates are 
presented in the lower panel of Table 12.  As may be seen, the results are similar across 
models and are quite satisfactory.  All of the coefficients have the expected signs, and are 
statistically significant at conventional levels.  These results indicate that the probability 
of experiencing a reversal is higher for countries with a large (lagged) current account 
deficit, a high external debt ratio, and a rapid rate of growth of domestic credit.  
Countries that have a higher level of net international reserves have a lower probability of 
experiencing a reversal.  The coefficients of the short-term debt and total debt service 
have the expected signs, but tend not to be significant.   
GDP Growth Models: The results from the estimation of the growth equation are 
reported in Panel A of Table 12.  The first equation (12.1) includes the current account 
reversal dummy, but does not include a term that interacts the reversals dummy with 
openness.  The second equation (12.2) includes the interactive term.  Equations (12.3) 
and (12.4) include lagged terms of the reversal dummy and of the reversal-openness 
interactive term.  As the Table shows, the lagged values were not significant.  Thus, in 
the discussion that follows I concentrate on equations (12.1) and (12.2). 
As may be seen, the growth equation results presented in Table 12 are interesting: 
The traditional covariates have the expected signs, and with the exception of openness 
they are significant at conventional levels.  More important for the topic of this paper, in 
equation (12.2) the coefficients of the current account reversal dummy is always 
significantly negative and the coefficients of the term that interacts openness and 
reversals is significantly positive.  According to these results, the effects of reversals on 
growth depend significantly on the degree of openness of the economy – measured as the 
ratio of imports plus exports to GDP --, and may be expressed as follows: 
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(9)     Growth Effects of Reversals = -4.323 + 0.028 openness. 
 
The variable openness in the data set varies significantly across countries.  Its mean for 
the complete period is 64%, its standard deviation is 35%, and its median is 57.4%.  The 
first quartile is 29.3%, and the third quartile is 84.5%.  This means that for a country with 
a degree of openness equal to the mean, the point estimate of the effect of a current 
account reversal on growth is: -2.531% (-4.323 + 0.028 x 64 = -2.531).  If the country’s 
degree of openness is equal to the first quartile, the (negative) effect of a reversal on 
growth is significantly higher at -3.50%.  But if the country is very open to international 
trade, and its degree of openness corresponds to the third quartile, the effect of a reversal 
on growth is much smaller, at –1.96%.  To make the point more vividly, consider the case 
of two neighboring countries in Latin America: Argentina and Chile.  While Argentina is 
relatively closed – the average value for openness variable in the 1995-2001 period is 
20% --, Chile is quite open, with an average for the openness variable of 60% during the 
same period.  This implies that a reversal in Argentina will tend to have a negative effect 
on growth equal to –3.763%; in Chile, on the other hand, the effect of the reversal on 
growth would only be –2.64.   
  In the rest of this section I report results from a number of extensions to the 
analysis presented in Table 12.  In particular I analyze three issues:  (a) whether the 
effects of reversals on growth depend on the level of external debt of the country in 
question.  (b) If reversals affect GDP growth differently countries with different 
exchange rate regimes.  And (c) whether the reduction in growth depends on the actual 
magnitude of the reversal. 
IV.3 Dollarization and Current Account Reversals 
  As pointed out above, many recent discussions on macroeconomic instability in 
the emerging economies have centered on the role of dollarized liabilities.  According to 
a number of authors countries with a high level of dollarized liabilities will be severely 
affected by reversals.
43  The argument is based on the notion that reversals tend to result 
                                                           
43 Strictly speaking this argument has been made in terms of “sudden stops.”  As I argued above, sudden 
stops and reversals are distinctly different phenomena.  The analysis in this section is in terms of reversals.  
On dollarization and the Argentine crisis see Calvo et al (2003).  On a general discussion on the extent of 
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(or be associated) with large exchange rate changes.  To the extent that the real exchange 
rate indeed depreciates, the ratio of foreign currency denominated debt to GDP will 
increase massively, forcing the country to implement a deep(er) and costly adjustment.  
In order to investigate whether this conjecture is supported by the data I estimated 
systems of the type of (4) – (7) where in addition to the regressors described above, I also 
included the reversals dummy interacted with the country’s total external debt  (both 
public and private) denominated in foreign currency.  Since (most) advanced countries 
are able to issue debt denominated in their own currency they are excluded from the 
analysis.  If countries with higher dollarized liabilities suffer more from a reversal we 
would expect the coefficient of the interactive term to be significantly negative. However, 
the results from these regressions (not reported here due to space considerations, but 
available on request) indicate that the interactive term is positive (rather than negative) 
and not significant at conventional levels.  This result was maintained when alternative 
estimation methods and different samples were used.   
There are several possible explanation for these results, including that total 
external debt is not the best indicator of the extent of dollarized liabilities; that the 
channels through which the presence of dollarized liabilities affect growth are complex, 
and not captured by a model such as the one estimated in this paper; and that what 
matters is the extent of currency mismatches in the financial sector, rather that the actual 
extent of dollarization.   
In order to further investigate this issue I included a variable that interacted 
Reversals with the ratio of foreign debt to the sum of imports and exports.
44  This 
interactive variable would be high in countries with a high external debt to GDP and/or a 
low degree of openness.  If the presence of dollarized liabilities and the lack of openness 
jointly amplify the costs of reversals, we would expect the estimated coefficient of this 
interactive variable to be significantly negative.  This, however, was not the case.  It 
estimated coefficient was 0.023 with a z-test statistic of 0.23. 
Unfortunately, there are no data for a large panel of countries on the extent of 
dollarization of the financial sector.  It is possible, however, to use a more limited data set 
                                                           
44 Of course, this is equivalent to a ratio of two ratios:  (a) The foreign debt to GDP ratio, relative to (b) the 
imports plus exports to GDP ratio (openness).   30
– both in terms of years and countries’ coverage – to further investigate this issue. I use 
the data set recently assembled by Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003b) that covers 
117 countries for the period 1996-201.  As before, the results obtained from this analysis 
did not provide support to the hypothesis that current account reversals result in higher 
real costs in countries with a greater degree of dollarization (detailed results available on 
request).
45   
The results reported above refer to whether the extent of dollarization affects the 
costs associated with current account reversals.  An alternative question, and one that is 
also important in the current policy debate is whether countries with a higher degree of 
dollarization have a higher probability of experiencing a current account reversal, or a 
“sudden stop” for that matter.  This would indeed be the case if countries with dollarized 
financial systems are particularly vulnerable to external shocks (Calvo, Izquierdo and 
Mejias2003b).  In order to investigate this issue I re-estimated the propensity probit 
equation on the probability of experiencing a reversal with Reinhart et al (2003b) 
dollarization index as an additional regressor.  The following results were obtained (z-
statistic in parenthesis; time and country specific fixed effects not reported): 
 
δ j t = 0.146 Current Account + 0.214 dollarization + 0.005 external debt 
        (8.52)        (4.72)             (2.18)      
 
 - 0.116 reserves + 0.001 credit growth  
   (-0.91)    (0.94)    
        N  =  892 
 
All in all, I consider these results to be preliminary in nature.  I believe that 
further research on the subject is required to come to a firmer conclusion on the effect of 
dollarization on the adjustment process.  This additional research should include an effort 
to increase the coverage of the dollarization variables, both in terms of time-span as well 
as in terms of countries.  Indeed, the fact that the best measure available – calculated by 
                                                           
45 In investigating this issue I used three procedures.  First, I included in the estimation of the treatment 
equations a term that interacts Reinhart et al (2003b) composite index of dollarization with the reversal 
dummy.  Second, I split the sample according to their classification of Very high, high, moderate and low 
degree of dollarization.  And third, I split the sample according to the authors’ four type of dollarization.  In 
neither of this case did I find support to the hypothesis that dollarization amplifies the effects of current 
account reversals.   31
Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003b) -- covers only 1996-2001 means that the 
regression analysis reported above was undertaken on a limited number of observations.
46   
IV.4  Exchange Regimes and Current Account Reversals 
A number of recent policy discussions on the future of the international financial 
architecture have focused on the role of alternative exchange regimes in helping countries 
cope better with the vicissitudes of the international economy.  In this section I 
investigate whether current account reversals have a different real effect on growth in 
countries with different exchange rate regimes.  In particular, I analyze whether, as 
supporters of flexibility have argued, countries with flexible exchange rates have a 
greater capacity to absorb external shocks.  If this were the case we would expect that the 
real costs of current account reversals would be smaller in countries with flexible regimes 
than in those with more rigid one.  
I use the exchange rate regime classification devised by Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2003), that considers the actual rather than the official regime for each 
individual country at a particular moment in time.
47  Countries are classified into four 
regimes: 
•  Hard pegs (Hard): This group includes counties with currency boards, 
members of currency unions and dollarized countries. 
•  Pegged regimes (Peg): This definition includes all alternative versions of 
pegged regimes, including pegged-but-adjustable.  It also includes the hard 
regimes described above. 
•  Intermediate regimes (Intermediate): This group includes crawling pegs, 
manage floats and other forms of intermediate regimes. 
•  Flexible rates: (Flexible): This group includes countries with flexible 
exchange rates, including free floating. 
 
                                                           
46 In fact, when I used the Reinhart et al (2003b) dollarization index on the complete sample, the results 
were encouraging, and suggested that dollarized liabilities may indeed amplify the costs of reversals.  
Naturally, this conclusion is only valid to the extent that the 1996-2001 index also captures the extent of 
dollarization during the longer period. At this point, however, I am not prepared to make that claim. 
47 See also Reinhart and Rogoff (2002).   32
I proceeded as follows: For each of the four regimes I estimated treatment regression 
systems of the type (4) – (7).  I then compared the estimates of both the reversals 
treatment dummy, as well as the term that interacts reversals and openness.  Formal χ
2 
tests for the equality of coefficients across regimes were then performed.  If more flexible 
regimes act as shock absorbers, as their supporters have argued, we would expect that 
their coefficient of reversals would be smaller, in absolute value, than that of the more 
rigid exchange rate arrangements.  In the actual estimation countries were classified 
according to the regime they had the year before the reversal was initiated.  This was 
done as a way of dealing with countries that switched regimes during the sample period, 
and to properly classify those countries that as a consequence of -- or in conjunction with 
– the reversal moved from one regime to a different one. 
The results obtained are presented in Table 13, where I only report the estimates 
for the Reversal A dummy and for the interactive term.  As may be seen, the point 
estimates for the Reversal A dummy is significantly negative for Hard, Pegged and 
Intermediate exchange rate regimes.  Moreover the point estimate of this dummy strictly 
declines (in absolute value), as the exchange rate regime becomes more flexible.  As may 
be seen, its estimated coefficient for the Flexible regime group is not significantly 
different from zero, suggesting that while reversals are indeed costly (in terms of reduced 
GDP growth) under rigid and semi-rigid regimes, they are not significantly so in 
countries with exchange rate flexibility.  A formal χ
2 test on the equality of these 
coefficients across different regimes’ equations indicates that the null hypotheses is 
rejected:  the χ
2 had a value of 21.1 for the Reversal A dummies, and 17.9 for the 
interactive terms. 
Since, as the results in Table 13 indicate, the point estimates of the interactive 
term also vary across regimes, the actual effect of reversals on growth should be 
compared for given degrees of openness.  The results indicate that for a variety of degrees 
of openness – up to 100% of GDP – the costs, in terms of a decline in GDP growth, of 
current account reversals has been higher in countries with more rigid exchange rate 
regimes, than in countries with more flexible ones.   33
IV.5 The Magnitude of the Reversals 
  The empirical results presented in this section has focused on current account 
reversals as a phenomenon that can be analyzed using a treatment-based analysis, where 
reversal events are captured by a “treatment” dummy variable.  A potential limitation of 
this analysis is that it does not consider the actual magnitude of the reversal, and 
considers that a reversal of 5% of GDP is equal to one of 8% of GDP.  In order to deal 
with this issue I estimated a number of treatment regressions systems that included terms 
that interacts the reversal dummy with the actual magnitude of the reversal.  To the extent 
that the magnitude of the reversals matters – with higher reversals being more costly – 
the coefficient of this interacted term should be significantly negative.  The results 
obtained from this analysis indicate that the estimated coefficient was indeed negative, 
with a point estimate of –0.015.  However, it was not significant (z-statistic equal to –
0.21), indicating that once reversals reach a certain level, their effects on growth are 
similar. 
V. Concluding  Remarks 
In this paper I have analyzed the anatomy of current account imbalances in the 
world economy during the last three decades.  The analysis proceeded from a general 
picture of the distribution of deficits and surpluses, to a detailed investigation of the most 
important characteristics of major current account adjustments.  The approach followed 
has been a combination of graphical displays, tabulation tables, non-parametric tests and 
treatment effects regressions.  I believe that by combining these different tools, I have 
been able to convey a clear and broad picture of the main characteristics of the 
adjustment process. 
The main findings of the analysis of the anatomy of current account imbalances 
may be summarized as follows: (a) throughout the sample period the vast majority of 
countries have run current account deficits.  Only in three regions has the median of 
current account balances been a surplus – industrial, Middle East and Asia --, and in all of 
them this surplus has been small.  (b) Large current account deficits have not had a 
significant degree of persistence through time.  Only a few countries have run persistently 
large deficits.  (c) The degree of persistence of large surpluses has been higher.  A larger 
number of countries have run persistently large surpluses, indicating that under the   34
current “rules of the game” the nature of the adjustment process is asymmetrical.  (e) 
Major reversals in current account deficits have tended to be persistent through time, and 
strongly associated to “sudden stops” of capital inflows.  (f) There is a high probability 
that reversals lead to an exchange rate crisis; the evidence also indicates that countries 
that try to face reversals by running down reserves significantly usually do not succeed.  
(g) There has been no statistically significant relationship between reversals and banking 
crises.  (h) Within a three year window there has been no statistically significant relation 
between reversals and IMF programs. 
The main results from the econometric analysis of the probability of countries 
experiencing a reversal, and of their effects on real economic activity may be summarized 
as follows.  (i) The probability of a country experiencing a reversal is appropriately 
captured by a small number of variables that include the (lagged) current account to GDP 
ratio, the external debt to GDP ratio, the level of international reserves, domestic credit 
creation, and debt services.  (ii) Current account reversals have had a negative effect on 
real growth that goes beyond their direct effect on investments.  (iii) There is persuasive 
evidence indicating that the negative effect of current account reversals on growth will 
depend on the country’s degree of openness.  More open countries will suffer less – in 
terms of lower growth – than countries with a lower degree of openness.  (iv)  I was 
unable to find evidence supporting the hypothesis that countries with a higher degree of 
dollarization are more severely affected by current account reversals than countries with a 
lower degree of dollarization.  And, (v) the empirical analysis suggests that countries 
with more flexible exchange rate regimes are able to accommodate the shocks stemming 
from a reversal better than countries with more rigid exchange rate regime. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of Current Account Deficits as Percentage of GDP,  
By Regions, 1970-2001 
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Figure 2: Average Current Account Deficits 
 as % of GDP by Region, 1970-2001 














































































































































































































































































































































    
First lag  0.543  0.403 
 (12.15)**  (12.25)** 
Second lag  0.169  0.082 
 (3.54)**  (3.81)** 
Third lag  0.143  0.026 
 (2.77)**  (1.50) 
Fourth lag  0.153  0.006 
 (3.15)**  (0.38) 
Pseudo-R
2 0.36  0.39 
Observations 2,381  2,381 
  Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
  Region and year dummies are included, but not reported   46
Table 2 
List of Countries with Persistent High Current Account Deficits 
By Region: 1970-2001 
Region (A) 
High Deficits 1 
(B) 
High Deficits 2 
Industrialized Countries     
Australia   1981-2000  -- 
Canada   1989-1994  -- 
Ireland   1976-1984  1978-1984 
New Zealand   1982-1988 & 1994-2001  1984-1988 
Portugal   1996-2001        -- 
Latin America and Caribbean    
Guyana   1979-1985        1979-1985       
Honduras   1975-1980      -- 
Nicaragua   1981-2000     1984-1990 & 1992-2000 
Asia     
Bhutan   1981-1999  1982-1989 
Lao PDR   1994-1998   -- 
Nepal   1996-2000               -- 
Papua New Guinea   1980-1984     -- 
Singapore   1972-1980            -- 
Africa     
Congo, Rep.   1900-1996  -- 
Guinea-Bissau   1982-1996  1982-1993 
Lesotho   1995-2001  1995-2000 
Mali   1984-1990              -- 
Mauritania   1975-1988        -- 
Mozambique   1987-1998        -- 
Swaziland   1978-1985   -- 
Middle East     
Cyprus   1977-1981              -- 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  1972-1977     -- 
Lebanon   1992-1998             -- 
Saudi Arabia   1983-1991   -- 
Eastern Europe     
Armenia   1994-1998  -- 
Azerbaijan   1995-1999     1995-1999 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on World Development Indicators   47
Table 3 
List of Countries with Persistent High Current Account Surpluses 




High Surplus 2 
Industrialized Countries     
Switzerland   1980-2001  1987-2001 
Belgium   1986-2001  -- 
Finland        1995-2001  -- 
Japan   1983-1992  -- 
Netherlands   1972-1977, 1981-1991 & 
1993-2000 
-- 
Latin America and Caribbean    
Trinidad and Tobago   1990-1996  -- 
Asia     
China        1994-1998  -- 
Fiji        1985-1989  -- 
Hong Kong, China   1971-1978 & 1980-1994  1984-1990 
Singapore        1988-2001  1994-2001 
Papua New Guinea  1992-1996  -- 
Africa     
Algeria   1980-1985  -- 
Botswana   1985-2001  1985-1989 & 1991-2001 
Chad   1980-1984  -- 
Gabon        1978-1984 & 1993-1997  1979-1984 
Gambia   1984-1994  -- 
Lesotho        1980-1984 & 1989-1994  1990-1994 
Mauritania        1995-2001  1995-2001 
Namibia   1990-2000  -- 
Nigeria        1984-1992  -- 
South Africa   1985-1995  -- 
Swaziland        1986-1991  1987-1991 
Middle East     
Kuwait        1975-1989  1980-1989 
Eastern Europe     
Russian Federation   1995-2001  -- 
Kuwait        1980-2001  1987-2001 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on World Development Indicators   48
Table 4 
Incidence of Reversals* 
 
Panel A: Reversal A 
Region No  reversal  Reversal 
    
Industrial countries  98.0  2.0 
Latin American and Caribbean  87.7  12.3 
Asia 87.7  12.3 
Africa 83.4  16.6 
Middle East  85.0  15.0 
Eastern Europe  88.9  11.1 
    
Total 88.2  11.8 
    
     Observations  2678   
     Pearson     
         Uncorrected χ
2 (5)  65.41   
         Design-based F(5, 13385)  13.08   
          p-value  0.00   
 
 
Panel B: Reversal B 
Region No  reversal  Reversal 
    
Industrial countries  97.3  2.7 
Latin American and Caribbean  92.0  8.0 
Asia 88.3  11.7 
Africa 88.3  11.7 
Middle East  86.6  13.4 
Eastern Europe  90.7  9.3 
    
Total 90.8  9.2 
    
     Observations  2501   
     Pearson     
         Uncorrected χ
2 (5)  37.31   
         Design-based F(5, 12500)  7.46   
          p-value  0.00   
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Table 5 
Sustainability Through Time of Current Account Reversals 
 
 Sustainability 
  Not sustained  Sustained  Total  
  At 3 years 
Reversal A  16.9 83.1 272 
      
Reversal B  23.7 76.3 198 
     
  At 5 years 
Reversal A  19.8 80.2 247 
      
Reversal B  32.4 67.6 179 
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Table 6 
Incidence of Sudden Stops 
 
Region  No sudden stop  Sudden stop 
    
Industrial countries  96.5  3.5 
Latin American and Caribbean  95.5  4.5 
Asia 96.1  3.9 
Africa 93.1  6.9 
Middle East  89.4  10.6 
Eastern Europe  92.9  7.1 
    
Total 94.4  5.6 
    
     Observations  2193   
     Pearson     
         Uncorrected χ
2 (5)  18.59   
         Design-based F(5, 12500)  3.72   
          p-value  0.002   
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Table 7 
Reversals and Sudden Stops* 
 
All countries 
  No sudden stop Sudden stop  Total 
No reversal  1892  69  1961 
 96.5  3.5  100 
 90.2  53.1  88.0 
Reversal 206  61  267 
 77.1  22.9  100 
 9.8  46.9  12.0 
Total 2098  130  2228 
 94.2  5.8  100 
 100  100  100 
Pearson χ
2 (1) = 159.78   p-value = 0.000 
 
Industrial countries 
  No sudden stop Sudden stop  Total 
No reversal  539 18  557 
  96.8 3.2  100 
  98.2 81.8  97.55 
Reversal  10 4  14 
  71.4 28.6  100 
  1.8 18.2  2.5 
Total  549 22  571 
  96.2 3.8  100 
  100 100  100 
Pearson χ
2 (1) =  21.14   p-value = 0.000 
 
Latin America and Caribbean 
  No sudden stop Sudden stop  Total 
No reversal  578 23  601 
  96.17 3.83  100 
  87.2 44.2  84.1 
Reversal  85 29  114 
  74.6 25.44  100 
  12.8 55.8  15.9 
Total  663 52  715 
  92.7 7.3  100 
  100 100  100 
Pearson χ
2 (1) =  18.35   p-value = 0.000 
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Table 7 (Continuation) 
 
Asia 
  No sudden stop Sudden stop  Total 
No reversal  294 12  306 
  96.1 3.9  100 
  87.5 48.0  84.8 
Reversal  42 13  55 
  76.4 23.6  100 
  12.5 52.0  15.2 
Total  336 25  361 
  93.1 6.9  100 
  100 100  100 
Pearson χ
2 (1) =   9.55   p-value = 0.002 
 
Africa 
  No sudden stop Sudden stop  Total 
No reversal  579 21  600 
  96.5 3.5  100 
  85.8 37.5  82.1 
Reversal  96 35  131 
  73.3 26.7  100 
  14.2 62.5  17.9 
Total  675 56  731 
  92.3 7.7  100 
  100 100  100 
Pearson χ
2 (1) =  60.63   p-value= 0.000 
 
Middle East 
  No sudden stop Sudden stop  Total 
No reversal  193 12  205 
  94.2 5.8  100 
  87.7 50.0  84.0 
Reversal  27 12  39 
  69.2 30.8  100 
  12.3 50.0  16.0 
Total  220 24  244 
  90.2 9.8  100 
  100 100  100 
Pearson χ
2 (1) =  22.38  p-value= 0.000 
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Table 7 (Continuation) 
 
Eastern Europe 
  No sudden stop Sudden stop  Total 
No reversal  159  8  167 
 95.2  4.8  100 
 91.4  57.1  88.8 
Reversal 15  6  21 
 71.4  28.6  100 
 8.6  42.9  11.2 
Total 174  14  188 
 92.6  7.4  100 
 100  100  100 
Pearson χ
2 (1) =  10.80   p-value= 0.001 
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Table 8 
Incidence of “International Reserves” and “Exchange Rates” Crises 
 
Region Exchange-Rate  Crises  Reserves  Crises 
    
Industrial 2.8  2.4 
Latin America  8.6  2.1 
Asia 8.2  6.3 
Africa 10.4  8.1 
Middle East  4.7  2.3 
East Europe  12.7  3.8 
    
Total 8.0  2.6 
    
      Number of  Observations  2528  2528 
    
Pearson    
     Uncorrected χ
2(5) 32.86  31.26 
     Design-based F(5, 12565)  6.57   6.24 
     P-value  0.00  0.00 
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Table 9 
Current Account Reversals and Occurrence of Crises 
 
Panel A: Reversal A and Reserves Crises 
 
Region  0dd Ratio  95% Conf. Interval 
      
Industrial countries  0.000 0.000  16.025 
Latin American and Caribbean  1.578 0.162  7.877 
Asia  0.681 0.075  2.974 
Africa  0.995 0.021  9.006 
Middle East  1.336 0.026  14.064 
Eastern Europe  3.689 0.325  24.370 
      
     Test of homogeneity       
         χ
2 (5)  2.86     
          P-value  0.72     
     Test odds ratio =1       
         Mantel-Haenszel χ
2 (5)  0.20     
          P-value  0.65     
 
 
Panel B: Reversal A and Exchange-Rate Crises 
 
Region  0dd Ratio  95% Conf. Interval 
      
Industrial countries  9.864 0.906  57.612 
Latin American and Caribbean  2.716 1.159  5.939 
Asia  3.006 1.068  7.678 
Africa  1.160 0.578  2.193 
Middle East  0.000 0.000  1.972 
Eastern Europe  1.693 0.376  5.917 
      
     Test of homogeneity       
         χ
2 (5)  4.80     
          P-value  0.44     
     Test odds ratio =1       
         Mantel-Haenszel χ
2 (5)  8.13     
          P-value  0.004       56
Table 10 
Current Account Reversals and Banking Crisis* 
 
Panel A:  Contemporaneous 





No reversal  2220 112  2332 
  95.2 4.8  100 
  88.1 86.2  88.0 
Reversal  299 18  317 
  94.3 5.7  100 
  11.9 13.9  12.0 
Total  2519 130  2649 
  95.1 4.9  100 
  100 100  100 
Pearson χ
2 (1) =   0.458   p-value = 0.498 
 
Panel B: Lagged Bank Crises 





No reversal  2332  110  2442 
 95.5  4.5  100 
 88.2  85.3  88.1 
Reversal 312  19  331 
 94.3  5.7  100 
 11.8  14.7  11.9 
Total 2644 129  2773 
 95.4  4.6  100 
 100  100  100 
Pearson χ
2 (1) =   1.00   p-value = 0.316 
 
Panel C:  Lagged Reversal A 





No reversal  2161 110  2271 
  95.2 4.8  100 
  88.2 85.3  88.1 
Reversal  288 19  307 
  93.8 6.19  100 
  11.8 14.7  11.9 
Total  2449 129  2578 
  95.0 5.0  100 
  100 100  100 
Pearson χ
2 (1) =   1.03   p-value = 0.31 
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Table 11 
Current Account Reversals and IMF Programs* 
PANEL A:  Contemporaneous Variables 





No Reversal  890 761  1651 
  53.9 46.1  100 
  86.2 84.6  85.5 
Reversal  142 138  280 
  50.7 49.3  100 
  13.8 15.4  14.5 
Total  1032 899  1931 
  53.4 46.6  100 
  100 100  100 
Pearson χ
2 (1) =   0.98  p-value = 0.32 
 
PANEL B:  IMF Programs lagged 





No Reversal  866 784  1650 
  52.5 47.5  100 
  84.5 86.6  85.5 
Reversal  159 121  280 
  56.8 43.2  100 
  15.5 13.4  14.5 
Total  1025 905  1930 
  53.1 46.9  100 
  100 100  100 
Pearson χ
2 (1) =   1.78   p-value = 0.18 
 
PANEL C:  Reversal A lagged 





No Reversal  912 768  1680 
  54.3 45.7  100 
  86.0 85.3  85.7 
Reversal  149 132  281 
  53.0 47.0  100 
  14.0 14.7  14.3 
Total  1061 900  1961 
  54.1 45.9  100 
  100 100  100 
Pearson χ
2 (1) =   0.15   p-value = 0.69   58
Table 12 
Growth and Current Account Reversals 
Treatment Effects Model – Two-Steps Estimates 
Variable (12.1)  (12.2)  (12.3)  (12.4) 
 Panel  A 
Population growth rate  0.299 0.294  0.241  0.274 
  (1.64) (1.59  (1.32)  (1.48) 
Investment to GDP  0.176 0.168  0.189  0.173 
  (6.98)** (6.58)**  (7.35)**  (6.68)** 
Government consumption to GDP  -0.162 -0.146  -0.172  -0.170 
  (4.81)** (4.28)**  (4.95)**  (4.84)** 
Openness  0.006 0.002  -0.006  -0.007 
  (0.57) (0.24)  (0.60)  (0.70) 
Log initial GDP per capita  -2.688 -2.733  -2.542  -2.472 
  (2.73)** (2.72)**  (2.59)**  (2.48)* 
Reversal A  -1.82 -4.32  -1.714  -3.931 
  (2.59)** (4.11)**  (2.44)*  (3.73)** 
Reversal A*Openness   0.028    0.028 
   (3.12)**    (3.03)** 
Reversal A (-1)      0.253  -0.033 
     (1.01)  (0.04) 
Reversal A (-1)*Openness (-1)     0.007 
     (0.77) 
    
 Panel  B 
Current account deficit to GDP (-1)  0.128 0.128  0.131  0.131 
  (12.01)** (12.01)**  (11.92)**  (11.94)**
External debt to GDP (-1)  0.004 0.005  0.006  0.006 
  (2.82)** (2.95)**  (3.52)**  (3.54)** 
Net int. reserves to GDP (-1)  -14.26 -15.07  -14.16  -14.25 
  (1.83) (1.97)*  (1.82)  (1.83) 
Short term ext. debt to exports (-1)  0.003 0.003  0.003  0.003 
  (0.50) (0.43)  (0.45)  (0.43) 
Domestic credit growth (-1)  0.0002 0.0002  0.0001  0.0002 
  (1.45) (1.42)  (1.53)  (1.53) 
External debt service / exports (-1)  0.002     
  (0.45)     
        
Hazard lambda  0.917 1.122  0.865  0.906 
  (2.07)* (2.48)*  (1.96)*  (2.01)* 
        
rho  0.214 0.256  0.203  0.209 
sigma  4.282 4.377  4.268  4.325 
        
Wald chi2 (215)  637.24 683.31  650.12  638.34 
Observations  1540 1544  1504  1502 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
(-1) denotes a one-period lagged variable 
Country-specific and year dummies are included, but not reported   59
Table 13 
Exchange Rate Regimes and Current Account Reversals: 




Exchange Rate Regime 
 
 
Reversal A Dummy 
 
Interactive Term 









































  * Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics.   
  Each equation was specified as explained in the text. 
 
 




List of Countries by Region 
Industrial Countries 
Australia Finland  Ireland  New  Zealand  Switzerland 
Austria France  Italy  Norway  United  Kingdom 
Belgium Germany  Japan  Portugal  United  States 
Canada Greece  Malta  Spain   
Denmark Iceland  Netherlands  Sweden   
        
Latin America and Caribbean 
Ant. and Barbuda  Brazil  El Salvador  Mexico  St. Vinc. & Gren, 
Argentina Chile Grenada  Nicaragua  Suriname 
Aruba  Colombia  Guatemala  Panama  Trin. & Tobago 
Bahamas, The  Costa Rica  Guyana  Paraguay  Uruguay 
Barbados Dominica  Haiti  Peru  Venezuela 
Belize  Dominican Rep.  Honduras  St. Kitts &Nevis   
Bolivia Ecuador  Jamaica  St.  Lucia   
        
Asia 
Bangladesh  Hong Kong  Lao PDR  Pakistan  Solomon Islands 
Bhutan  India  Malaysia  Papua New Guinea  Sri Lanka 
Cambodia Indonesia  Maldives  Philippines  Thailand 
China Kiribati  Nepal  Singapore  Vietnam 
Fiji       
        
Africa 
Angola Comoros  Guinea-Bissau  Mozambique  Sudan 
Benin Congo,  Rep.  Kenya  Namibia  Swaziland 
Botswana Cote  d'Ivoire  Lesotho  Niger  Tanzania 
Burkina Faso  Djibouti  Madagascar  Nigeria  Togo 
Burundi Ethiopia  Malawi  Rwanda  Tonga 
Cameroon Gabon Mali  Senegal  Tunisia 
Cape Verde  Gambia, The  Mauritania  Seychelles  Uganda 
Central African Rep.  Ghana  Mauritius  Sierra Leone  Zimbabwe 
Chad Guinea  Morocco  South  Africa   
        
Middle East 
Bahrain  Iran, Islamic Rep.  Kuwait  Oman  Syrian Arab Rep. 
Cyprus  Israel  Lebanon  Saudi Arabia  Yemen, Rep. 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  Jordan       
        
Eastern Europe 
Albania Czech  Republic  Latvia  Romania  Turkmenistan 
Armenia Estonia  Lithuania  Russian  Federation  Ukraine 
Azerbaijan Hungary  Moldova  Slovak Republic  Uzbekistan 
Belarus Kazakhstan  Mongolia  Slovenia   
Bulgaria Kyrgyz  Republic  Poland  Turkey   
   61
Table A.2 
Mean Current Account to GDP Ratios 
By Region: 1970-2001 
 
Year Industrial  Latin 
America 
Asia  Africa  Middle East  East Europe  Total 
              
1970  -0.05 7.52 0.26  0.90  6.67  .  2.62 
1971  -0.28 5.53 0.64  5.25  2.23  .  2.05 
1972  -1.50 3.78 2.43  6.20  -3.40  .  0.75 
1973  -1.17 3.33 1.35  7.20  0.23  .  1.13 
1974  2.97 3.26  4.56  -3.07  -8.04  1.50 0.44 
1975  1.47 2.36  5.44  4.35  -8.62  3.50 2.17 
1976  2.16 1.48  0.25  5.55  -9.78  3.80 1.46 
1977  1.82 4.05  -0.74  3.88  -5.25  5.19 2.09 
1978  0.50 3.70  1.85  8.53  0.80  1.90 4.23 
1979  1.40 4.51  -1.57  6.44  -8.16  1.50 2.76 
1980  2.16 7.05  7.74  7.21  -9.02  0.10 4.92 
1981  2.39 10.05  11.64  10.00  -8.00  1.05  7.35 
1982  2.36 9.10  11.01  11.01  -1.68  0.97 7.82 
1983  1.20 6.33  8.44  8.25  1.63  1.26 5.91 
1984  0.98 4.14  3.69  5.88  1.34  0.15 3.78 
1985  1.15 2.72  5.32  5.90  1.45  1.60 3.79 
1986  0.96 5.44  4.02  6.28  1.30  3.09 4.41 
1987  1.03 5.36  3.25  4.75  0.48  0.08 3.59 
1988  0.91 4.42  2.73  6.01  -0.10  -1.30 3.63 
1989  1.18 5.35  3.82  4.52  -4.36  0.04 3.21 
1990  1.18 4.25  4.31  4.39  -4.13  3.00 3.04 
1991  0.67 7.29  2.48  5.08  28.84  2.67 6.24 
1992  0.43 5.55  3.25  6.34  9.29  0.10 4.45 
1993  -0.46 6.01 4.94  6.58  8.13  1.98 4.71 
1994  -0.35 4.36 2.52  6.77  2.87  1.08 3.52 
1995  -0.85 4.83 3.31  8.84  1.39  2.90 4.30 
1996  -0.78 6.12 3.42  8.71  0.32  7.09 5.09 
1997  -1.18 7.34 4.00  4.80  -0.09  6.97 4.20 
1998  -0.33 7.22  -0.63  6.71  6.16  9.66 5.12 
1999  -0.13 4.81  -2.99  5.16  -2.40  6.14 2.76 
2000  -0.57 2.76  -3.77  4.23  -9.22  2.66 0.84 
2001  -0.45 3.32  -3.51  5.95  -4.16  3.31 1.98 
             
Total  0.62 5.36  3.19  6.34  -0.04  3.87 3.96 
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Table A.3 
Median Current Account to GDP Ratios 
By Region: 1970-2001 
 
Year Industrial  Latin 
America 
Asia  Africa  Middle East  East Europe  Total 
              
1970  -0.40 4.10 0.90  0.90  5.90  .  0.90 
1971  -0.50 4.60 1.00  5.25  7.25  .  1.05 
1972  -1.00 1.45 1.55  6.20  1.25  .  0.40 
1973  0.15 1.05  0.70  7.20  2.25  .  0.85 
1974  2.90 4.00  3.00  2.40  -0.80  1.50 2.90 
1975  1.35 4.10  3.65  6.50  -3.80  3.50 3.30 
1976  2.65 1.40  0.20  5.05  -3.20  3.80 3.30 
1977  2.05 3.95  -0.70  4.10  -1.65  5.20 2.80 
1978  0.65 3.95  2.55  9.90  3.00  1.90 3.50 
1979  0.70 4.70  2.70  6.40  -8.90  1.50 3.20 
1980  2.30 5.55  4.80  8.40  -3.95  0.10 4.35 
1981  2.70 9.05  8.55  10.00  1.45  1.05 6.85 
1982  1.95 7.60  7.80  9.50  -1.55  1.50 6.55 
1983  0.90 4.70  7.30  6.40  5.10  0.90 4.30 
1984  0.25 3.30  2.10  4.10  4.90  0.65 2.50 
1985  1.00 2.10  3.85  4.20  2.60  1.70 2.95 
1986  -0.10 3.00 2.40  3.60  2.30  3.30 2.85 
1987  0.40 4.15  1.70  5.00  2.45  0.90 2.60 
1988  1.15 2.25  2.75  6.00  1.55  1.30 2.60 
1989  1.50 4.40  3.45  3.65  -0.50  1.70 2.80 
1990  1.40 2.80  4.45  3.80  -1.00  3.65 2.80 
1991  0.90 4.80  3.20  3.70  10.10  0.70 3.10 
1992  0.80 4.40  2.00  5.80  9.30  -0.10 3.25 
1993  0.50 4.70  4.50  6.60  7.15  1.95 3.45 
1994  -0.40 3.50 4.60  5.70  4.70  1.60 2.90 
1995  -0.75 3.20 4.65  5.50  0.60  1.85 2.70 
1996  -0.95 4.60 3.90  4.60  -0.35  5.40 3.65 
1997  -0.65 4.90 4.10  5.20  -0.20  6.20 3.60 
1998  0.20 4.90  0.70  5.60  3.30  7.00 3.80 
1999  -0.50 3.60  -1.60  4.15  -0.30  4.30 2.70 
2000  0.50 3.40  -1.75  3.30  -7.30  4.20 2.80 
2001  -0.05 3.30  -2.60  3.95  -4.80  4.60 2.10 
             
Total  0.70 4.10  2.70  5.30  1.40  3.00 3.10 
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Table A.4 
Third Quartile Current Account to GDP Ratios 
By Region: 1970-2001 
 
Year Industrial  Latin 
America 
Asia  Africa  Middle East  East Europe  Total 
              
1970  0.60 6.90  1.30  1.90  11.50  .  4.10 
1971  0.40 7.80  1.70  8.30  9.30  .  5.70 
1972  0.30 2.40  3.60  12.00  4.15  .  2.50 
1973  1.30 4.10  1.30  10.00  5.75  .  2.90 
1974  4.40 10.00  5.60  4.60  12.40  1.50  5.30 
1975  4.40 6.80  9.40  8.40  14.80  3.50 7.60 
1976  4.30 4.00  6.20  8.35  3.30  3.80 5.40 
1977  3.60 7.30  4.15  7.70  2.60  5.20 5.90 
1978  2.50 7.60  3.85  12.40  9.20  1.90 8.90 
1979  2.70 6.70  5.80  12.30  5.30  1.50 7.10 
1980  3.60 11.60  10.90  13.00  2.60  5.00 10.50 
1981  4.30 13.45  13.00  12.90  5.90  2.70 12.20 
1982  4.00 11.75  13.10  13.70  8.30  2.30 10.70 
1983  2.40 7.45  11.00  12.40  7.70  3.10 8.10 
1984  3.00 6.60  4.95  8.80  8.20  1.95 6.35 
1985  3.60 6.40  6.65  8.40  7.50  2.05 6.60 
1986  3.30 7.80  5.70  8.20  9.40  5.20 6.40 
1987  3.20 8.75  5.60  9.65  5.40  2.50 6.30 
1988  3.00 7.65  5.80  9.75  4.10  1.70 6.60 
1989  3.60 7.10  7.90  7.25  5.20  2.00 5.70 
1990  3.40 7.65  6.85  9.00  2.15  8.30 6.40 
1991  2.80 12.40  6.75  9.60  20.00  3.50  7.70 
1992  2.70 8.00  4.70  8.90  17.20  3.50 7.10 
1993  1.70 8.90  7.90  8.30  13.00  4.20 7.90 
1994  1.70 7.30  6.20  9.20  6.70  3.70 6.30 
1995  1.15 5.50  7.95  11.20  5.05  5.65 7.10 
1996  1.85 7.80  7.50  10.40  4.20  9.20 8.10 
1997  2.10 10.50  8.10  7.85  2.10  10.80 7.20 
1998  2.50 8.90  5.40  10.15  12.35  11.30  8.90 
1999  2.80 5.60  2.10  10.75  1.90  8.00 5.90 
2000  3.10 5.20  0.60  8.50  1.20  5.90 5.50 
2001  2.60 4.65  1.70  8.30  0.00  6.60 4.80 
             
Total  3.00 8.00  6.40  9.90  6.40  6.10 7.20 
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Table A.5 
First Quartile Current Account to GDP Ratios 
By Region: 1970-2001 
 
Year Industrial  Latin 
America 
Asia  Africa  Middle East  East Europe  Total 
              
1970  -0.70 2.80 0.10  -0.10  2.60  .  0.76 
1971  -1.30 0.10 0.10  2.20  -4.85  .  0.08 
1972  -1.70 0.60  -1.20  0.40  -10.95  .  -1.27 
1973  -2.70 -0.20  -0.70  4.40  -5.30  .  0.28 
1974  -0.10 2.80 0.90  -17.40  -10.90  1.50 -4.75 
1975  -0.30 1.30 0.70  0.40  -30.80  3.50 -1.57 
1976  0.75 -1.10  -3.40  3.05  -12.90  3.80 -0.39 
1977  -0.10 0.40  -4.95  0.60  -12.80  5.20 -0.95 
1978  -1.40 0.25  -0.35  4.20  0.70  1.90 1.26 
1979  0.00 0.40  -4.40  0.00  -13.70  1.50 -1.58 
1980  0.50 0.55  1.20  2.20  -15.80  -4.80  -0.93 
1981  -0.40 5.35 2.70  5.40  -17.00  -0.60 1.50 
1982  -1.00 5.00 3.40  4.70  -6.50  -0.90 2.08 
1983  -0.40 1.70 0.90  3.40  -2.70  -0.20 1.12 
1984  -0.80 1.20 0.50  0.10  -3.40  -1.65 -0.26 
1985  -1.60 -0.50 1.95  1.10  -1.10  1.15  0.38 
1986  -1.60 0.60  -0.15  0.60  0.60  1.00 0.22 
1987  -1.00 1.25 0.20  0.45  0.20  -0.20 0.26 
1988  0.10 0.50  -2.15  1.65  1.40  -1.80 0.07 
1989  -0.20 0.70 0.25  0.95  -12.40  -0.90 -0.71 
1990  -1.00 -1.65 2.15  0.90  -12.40  -1.10 -1.00 
1991  -1.50 0.75 1.10  0.40  2.10  -1.20 0.25 
1992  -2.00 -0.30 0.40  1.60 1.30  -0.90 0.15 
1993  -3.10 0.60 1.30  1.80  -0.10  -0.95 0.27 
1994  -2.80 0.20 0.30  0.30  -4.25  -2.00 -0.83 
1995  -2.95 1.55 1.85  2.10  -4.05  0.15 0.48 
1996  -3.55 1.60 0.40  1.30  -3.20  2.40 0.31 
1997  -4.15 2.60 1.80  1.35  -1.35  2.50 0.84 
1998  -3.20 2.40  -3.00  1.80  0.35  2.50 0.37 
1999  -2.60 2.50  -7.10  0.25  -4.80  1.90 -1.15 
2000  -2.90 3.00  -6.55  0.10  -22.40  2.80 -2.34 
2001  -2.80 1.95  -6.75  0.05  -11.70  1.20 -1.93 
             
Total  -1.45 1.22  -0.58  0.95  -6.75  0.56 -0.28 
 
 
                                                           
i Nicaragua’s severe crisis is largely the result of the economic mismanagement during the Sandinista rule 
during the 19880s. 